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COMMENTS
Court, or Board of Medical Examiners, under their power to
regulate the respective legal or medical professions. 53
The chance that these hazards will materialize seems small,
and the more aggressive professionals may wish immediate cor-
porate status. Others may assume a wait-and-see approach while
taking advantage of a congressionally approved pension plan
under H.R. 10.
It would seem desirable for Congress to take the initiative to
relieve professionals and other self-employed persons from hav-
ing to change their organizational form solely to gain a tax ad-
vantage now available to others. Nothing in the literature ad-
vances any reason why the corporate form should enjoy tax
advantage over other forms of business. This anomalous situa-
tion creates not only a discriminatory effect on tax liability but
also an undue burden on those incorporating purely for tax
benefits.
Larry J. Gunn
DUTY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
IN LOUISIANA
"Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduci-
ary relation to the corporation and its shareholders, and shall
discharge the duties of their respective positions in good
faith, and with that diligence, care, judgment and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circum-
stances in like positions. ''1
Thus Section 91 of the new Louisiana Business Corporation Law
defines the duty of corporate officers and directors in Louisiana.
It is identical with Section 36 of the 1928 Corporation Act 2 with
the notable exception that it specifically extends the fiduciary
relationship of officers and directors to shareholders. The 1928
provision was in turn taken almost verbatim from the Model
Business Corporation Act.3 The Commissioners' Notes to the
Model Act point out it was necessary to specify the standard of
care to which officers and directors would be held due to the
conflict among decisions. 4 Prior to 1928, some courts interpreting
53. LA. R.S. 12:814, 914 (Supp. 1969).
1. LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968).
2. La. Acts 1928, No. 250, § 36.
3. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 33 (1928). This Model Act is also known as
the Uniform Business Corporation Act and was adopted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1928. It is to be distinguished
from the later ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act.
4. 5 LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. 225 Comment (West 1951).
19691
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Louisiana law had said directors and officers of a corporation
"were the trustees of the stockholders" and held corporate prop-
erty "in a very legitimate sense as trustees ' 1 while others said
they owed a "special contractual duty ... [a] s fiduciaries" 6 and
still others held them to a standard of ordinary care and in-
dicated they would be liable only for an error "of so gross a kind
that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, would not
have fallen into it." '7 The 1928 Act eliminated these variations in
terminology but still left the courts only a nebulous guide. s
While in some areas the Business Corporation Law has set out
specific duties to be fulfilled9 and in other areas similar situa-
tions have recurred enough to allow the formulation of more
definite guides, 1° the basic duty of corporate officers and direc-
tors in Louisiana remains one of due care under the circum-
stances." Now this duty is expressly extended to the sharehold-
ers of a corporation as well as to the corporation itself.
THE BASIC DUTY OF DUE CARE
As in tort law, the conduct of an "ordinarily prudent man"
and the duty of due care owed by corporation officers and di-
rectors is difficult to define and varies with each change in the
factual situation. 12 In determining whether a specific act or fail-
ure to act amounts to a breach of duty under Louisiana law,
courts have considered such factors as the duties imposed by the
corporation charter,13 the good or bad faith accompanying the
conduct,14 the type of authorization for the conduct,15 the actual
or imputed knowledge of corporation affairs of the officer or
director, 1 the residence of the officer,1 7 the time of the alleged
5. Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 624 (1874). Cf. Hibernia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Succession of Cancienne, 140 La. 969, 974, 74 So. 267, 269 (1917) : "The
directors of a corporation are trustees, and its creditors, like the stockholders, are
the cestui que trust." See also Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So.
926 (1904).
6. LaGrone v. Brown, 161 La. 784, 788, 109 So. 490, 491 (1926).
7. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 68, 78 (La. 1829).
8. Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act. of 1928, 2 LA. L. REV.
597, 635 (1940).
9. E.g., LA. R.S. 12:84, 12:92 (Supp. 1968).
10. Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928, 2 LA. L. REV.
597, 635 (1940).
11. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 68 (La. 1829) ; A. M. & J. Solari, Ltd.
v. Fitzgerald, 150 So.2d 896 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ refused, 244 La. 622,
153 So.2d 414 (1963); 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF TiE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1038 (1965 rev. vol.) (hereinafter cited as FLETCHER).
12. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (3d ed. 1964).
13. Pontchartrain R.R. v. Paulding, 11 La. 41 (1837).
14. Bourdette v. Sieward, 107 La. 258, 31 So. 630 (1902).
15. Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45, 9 So. 29 (1891).
16. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 68 (La. 1829).
17. Semple v. Frisco Land Co., 124 La. 663, 50 So. 619 (1909).
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breach,," and the personal gain or lack of it to the officer or
director charged with the breach. 19 Cases from other jurisdic-
tions indicate the size and nature of the corporation, ° whether
the director or officer is paid or unpaid 2 1 and his special knowl-
edge or background 2 are also factors to be considered. Still other
decisions emphasize that officers and directors have a duty to
act only intra vires and within the scope of their authority.23
These holdings merely illustrate the application of the ordinarily
prudent man standard of Section 91 and the decision in any par-
ticular case must depend on the totality of facts and circum-
stances in that case. While this due care standard fails to pro-
vide a quick and definite answer to the question of whether any
given conduct is a breach of duty or not, it does allow needed
judicial flexibility.
Courts in the exercise of this discretion have generally rec-
ognized that liability should not be imposed for mere errors of
business judgment where no negligence or bad faith is involved.24
This "business judgment rule" follows naturally from a statute
such as Section 91 which requires merely good faith and the care
and skill of ordinarily prudent men under like circumstances.
The courts recognize that even the most honest and conscientious
officer or director will not always decide correctly the often
complex corporate issues which come before him. To make errors
of business judgment a basis of liability would make officers
and directors virtual insurers of a corporation's success and this
is a responsibility few would be willing to undertake.
Generally, if an officer or director acts in good faith and in
what he honestly believes to be the best interests of the corpora-
tion there will be no liability for unfortunate results.2 5 It is neces-
sary, however, that he have some basis for the exercise of his
business judgment and if he negligently fails to keep abreast of
18. Faurie v. Millaudon, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 476 (La. 1825) ; Marine Forwarding &
Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So.2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
19. Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616 (1874) ; Commercial Germania Trust
& Savings Bank v. Jurgens, 134 La. 755, 64 So. 703 (1913).
20. Mann v. Commonwealth Bond Corp., 27 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1938);
Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
21. Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 292 Mass. 1, 197 N.E. 649 (1935).
22. Barnes v. Andrews, 298, F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
23. Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45, 9 So. 29 (1891) ; Pontchartrain
R.R. v. Paulding, 11 La. 41 (1837) ; H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 234 (1961) (here-
inafter cited as HErN).
24. Reliance Homestead Ass'n v. Nelson, 179 La. 680, 154 So. 734 (1934)
Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. Jurgens, 134 La. 755, 64 So. 703
(1913) ; Pool v. Pool, 16 So.2d 132 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943) ; FLETCHER § 1039.
25. Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. Jurgens, 134 La. 755, 64
So. 703 (1913) ; HENN § 233.
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corporation affairs the business judgment rule will not excuse
errors that result. 26 An ordinarily prudent officer or director is
expected to know something of the corporation he directs 27 and
the extent of his required knowledge is determined by the same
factors that affect the overall standard of care required of him. 2
It must also be considered, however, that directors often do not
have a business background and that officers and directors must
sometimes decide matters requiring legal or technical knowledge.
Realizing this, courts generally recognize that officers and di-
rectors are entitled to place reasonable reliance upon the advice
of business and technical experts.2 9 Thus a Louisiana court held
certain directors were not liable for failure to avoid a surtax
when they had relied upon the advice of accountants and attor-
neys.8 0 Similarly, officers and directors are entitled to rely upon
the books and records of the corporation as being accurate in the
absence of any fact which should reasonably cause them to sus-
pect otherwise.31
These rules have been partially codified as to directors in
Section 92 of the Business Corporation Law. 32 This provides that
a director relying in good faith on reports made by corporation
officials, appraisers, or accountants, or on corporation financial
statements or records is not liable for certain improper acts. Of
course if an officer or director were responsible for some inac-
curacy in the reports or records, or had not exercised reasonable
care in selecting the persons who prepared them, then he would
not be in good faith nor privileged to rely upon them.2 3 Generally,
however, the business judgment rule and the accompanying right
to rely on expert advice and corporation records protect officers
and directors from liability for good faith errors of judgment.
In addition to the business judgment rule, there is another
broad limitation of liability that may protect an officer or di-
rector even if he has breached his duty of due care in supervis-
26. FLETCHER § 1040; cf. Farwell v. Milliken & Farwell, Inc., 145 So.2d 644
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
27. A. M. & J. Solari, Ltd. v. Fitzgerald, 150 So.2d 896 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963).
28. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ; Hatch v. City Bank
of New Orleans, 1 Rob. 470 (La. 1842) ; Commercial Bank of Menominee v.
Wiedman, 301 Mich. 405, 3 N.W.2d 323 (1942).
29. FLETCHER § 1027.
30. Pool v. Pool, 22 So.2d 131 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
31. Hatch v. City Bank of New Orleans, 1 Rob. 470 (La. 1842) ; FLETCHER§ 1060.
32. LA. R.S. 12:92(E) (Supp. 1968).
33. Gallin v. National City Bank, 155 Misc. 880, 281 N.Y.S. 795 (N.Y. 1935).
[Vol. XXIX
COMMENTS
ing corporate affairs. An officer or director will only be held
accountable to the corporation for specific losses resulting from
his managerial neglect: 4 The fact that he has been negligent will
not render him liable for the corporation's failure if it appears
the corporation would have failed anyhow.3 5 The determination
whether a breach of duty causes specific losses is made in accord
with the general causation rules of negligence law.36 Apparently
the same rules apply to determine the extent to which a corpora-
tion official is liable to a shareholder for a breach of fiduciary
duty to him . 3 This limitation of liability differs from the busi-
ness judgment rule in that the business judgment rule is a guide
in determining if there has been a breach of duty at all under
Section 91 of the Business Corporation Law while the limitation
of liability pertains to the extent of liability once a breach of
duty has been found.
Section 94 of the Business Corporation Law offers a further
protection for a director who does not actually participate in
negligent or wrongful acts of the board of directors. He is not
liable if he was absent from the meeting of directors at which
the action was authorized or if he was present or represented at
the meeting but his dissent was either noted in the minutes of
the meeting or promptly filed at the registered office of the
corporation.3" This provision makes it clear what steps a director
must take if he is to escape personal liability for wrongful acts
of the board when he is present or represented at the meeting
at which the acts are authorized.30 While it seems that unrepre-
sented absence from a meeting may itself create liability for
negligence under the general rule of Section 91, it can be argued
that the express language of Section 94 precludes this result and
that in no case will a director be liable for action authorized at a
board meeting unless he is present or represented. The comment
to Section 94, however, indicates it was not intended to change
the former law; and prior jurisprudence shows a director may
be liable for action taken at a board meeting if he is absent due
to his own neglect.4 ° This interpretation seems more in accord
with the basic duty of due care.
34. Hawks v. Bright, 51 La. Ann. 79, 24 So. 615 (1898); Pontchartrain
R.R. v. Paulding, 11 La. 41 (1837) ; Percy v. Millaudon, 3 La. 568 (1832)
FLETCHER § 1063.1.
35. Hawks v. Bright, 51 La. Ann. 79, 24 So. 615 (1898) ; Barnes v. An-
drews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); HENN § 235.
36. HENN § 235.
37. Bourdette v. Sieward, 107 La. 258, 31 So. 630 (1902).
38. LA. R.S. 12:94 (Supp. 1968).




DUTIES SPECIFICALLY IMPOSED BY THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION LAW
Section 91 of the Business Corporation Law sets out in gen-
eral terms the duties of officers and directors to the corporation
and its shareholders. Section 92 elaborates upon the general du-
ties of Section 91 by specifying certain responsibilities of officers
and directors and the extent of liability in each case. Its primary
thrust is to insure protection for creditors or other third parties
who rely on the apparent financing of the corporation.
Section 92A provides that if a corporation transacts any
business other than that incidental to its organization before the
amount of paid-in capital stated in the articles of incorporation
has been paid in full the officers and directors who participate
in the transactions are liable for the debts or liabilities of the
corporation that result.4' Although the articles of incorporation
need not necessarily state an amount of paid-in capital,42 this
provision protects creditors and others who may be misled if an
amount is stated and not paid. The liability of officers and di-
rectors who participate in these premature transactions of the
corporation is joint and several with the corporation and each
other.43 The Comments to Section 92A indicate that joint and
several liability is the equivalent of solidary liability and that
the rights of contribution and subrogation should exist among
and in favor of directors and officers held liable.
Paragraphs B and C of Section 92 specify the liability of of-
ficers and directors who participate in the issuance of "watered
stock," i.e., shares issued as fully paid although the corporation
has not received full lawful consideration for them.4 4 Section 92B
imposes a general liability on any officer or director who know-
ingly or negligently consents to the issuance of shares in viola-
tion of the Business Corporation Law or prior statutes. This li-
ability is joint and several also4 5 and extends "to the corporation
and any person who suffers any loss or damage as a result there-
of.1 4 6 It applies to shares issued in violation of any of the man-
datory provisions in Sections 51-5847 and is particularly appli-
cable to violations of Section 52C which requires that the con-
sideration for shares be paid in cash, property, or services ac-
41. LA. R.S. 12:26, 12:92A (Supp. 1968).
42. See id. 12:24, Comment (f).
43. Id. 12:92A.
44. Id. 12:92B, C.
45. Cf. LaGrone v. Brown, 161 La. 784, 109 So. 490 (1926).
46. LA. R.S. 12:92B (Supp. 1968).
47. E.g., LA. R.S. 12:54, 12:56B(2), C, D, 12:57 (Supp. 1968).
[Vol. XXIX
COMMENTS
tually rendered to the corporation, the fair value of which is
not less than the dollar amount of the consideration fixed for the
shares, and that such consideration be paid before the shares
are issued.4 Under Paragraph C of Section 92 there is a similar
liability "to the corporation for the benefit of creditors or share-
holders ' '4 9 if property or services taken in payment for shares are
grossly overvalued. These provisions are basically the same as
the prior law 5° and accurately reflect the limited Louisiana juris-
prudence in this area. 1 They provide a remedy to the corpora-
tion because it does not receive full value for "watered shares"
and to creditors who suffer damage due to the diluted financial
structure of the corporation.5 2
Other ways in which a corporate financial structure may be
weakened are the improper payment of dividends and the unlaw-
ful repurchase or redemption of its own stock by the corpora-
tion. Both of these return capital invested in the business to the
shareholders, thus leaving less security for corporation creditors
and the shareholders who do not participate in the capital re-
turn. Section 92D5 3 provides that if any unlawful dividends are
paid or any assets are returned to shareholders in violation of
the Business Corporation Law,54 or if the corporation repur-
chases or redeems its own shares improperly,5 the directors who
knowingly or negligently authorize such action shall be liable.
Again the liability is joint and several and extends to both the
corporation and its creditors. The liability is limited, however, to
the amount of the unlawful distribution and by a two-year pre-
emptive period measured from the date on which the distribution
was made.5 6
These provisions should be considered in light of Section 93E
which gives to directors held liable under Section 92D a right of
"indemnity against each of the shareholders for the proportion-
ate amount of the unlawful distribution received by such share-
48. Id. 12:520.
49. Id. 12:92C.
50. La. Acts 1928, No. 250, §§ 15, 20, 27.
51. Rapides Grocery Co. v. Grant, 165 La. 593, 115 So. 791 (1928) ; LaGrone
v. Brown, 161 La. 784, 109 So. 490 (1926).
52. See HE §§ 169, 170.
53. LA. R.S. 12:92D (Supp. 1968).
54. Id. 12:63 specifies when dividends can be paid. For a discussion of
this and the Business Corporation Law provisions regulating repurchase and re-
demption of shares see Miller, The 1968 Business Corporation Law of Louisiana,
29 LA. L. REv. 435, 455 (1969).




holder. '57 This action also must be brought within two years and
apparently is not available to corporation officers58 or to direc-
tors who knowingly authorize an unlawful distribution of assets.
This right of indemnification is a valuable protection for a di-
rector who might negligently run afoul of the technical provi-
sions of the law dealing with dividends and the repurchase and
redemption of shares. It is in accord with the policy of the Busi-
ness Corporation Law and the business judgment rule which do
not unduly penalize directors for good faith errors. Presumably,
however, corporation officers should know more about corpora-
tion law and corporate affairs so this right of indemnity is de-
nied to them.
DUTIES IMPOSED BY THE JURISPRUDENCE
In determining the duty of corporation officers and directors,
courts in Louisiana and elsewhere have encountered some situa-
tions often enough to form fairly definite guidelines. While these
rules are not as certain as those specifically imposed by the cor-
poration act, they provide some elaboration of the general fidu-
ciary relation and due care standard. Generally these recurring
situations can be grouped into cases where officers or directors
benefit to the detriment of the corporation and cases where they
benefit at the expense of the shareholders.
Corporate Injury
An officer or director is most likely to benefit to the detri-
ment of the corporation when he is in business competition with
it. However, a strict rule against engaging in the same or similar
business as the corporation would impose a hardship on officers
and be particularly harsh on directors. 59 Thus courts do not for-
bid such competition entirely, but they do scrutinize it for unfair
advantage or profit at the corporation's expense. 60 Such unfair-
ness has been found when a director or officer utilizes inside in-
formation to secure a secret profit for himself,r' when he lures
57. Id. 12:93E.
58. Section 92D is worded so as to apply only to directors and Section 93E
would seem to apply only to directors held liable under Section 92D. Also, Section
93E does not speak of officers at all. Presumably, however, an officer could take
part in an unlawful distribution or return of assets forbidden by Section 92D.
59. FLETCHER § 856; Ramsey, Director's Power To Compete with his Cor-
poration, 18 IND. L.J. 293 (1943).
60. Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616 (1874); House of Campbell, Inc. v. Camp-
bell, 172 So.2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).




away corporation customers or employees to a new firm,6 2 or
when he uses corporation funds to set up a competing enter-
prise.6 3 Activities such as these, whether done personally or
through another corporation, violate the fiduciary relationship
and breach the duty of good faith.
6 4
Similarly, when a director or officer transacts business with
his corporation the opportunity for unfair personal benefit
again prompts the courts to examine the circumstances very
carefully.6 5 Typical of these transactions are sales and leases to
or from the corporation6 6 and the acquisition of corporate notes
and mortgages by officers or directors.2 Other situations which
present similar conflicts of interest should be similarly suspect,
and the burden is generally upon the officer or director seek-
ing to uphold such a transaction to show good faith and fair-
ness.69 Even if a breach of duty is found, however, the rule in
Louisiana seems to be that the transaction is not void but merely
voidable at the option of the corporation.7 0
Subject to suspicion also are transactions between a corpora-
tion and another corporation in which its directors or officers
have financial or other interests.7'1 Often the two corporations
will have common directors and one will control the other. The
danger is that the subsidiary corporation and its minority share-
62. Marine Forwarding & Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So.2d 528 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963) (no liability because fiduciary relationship had ended).
63. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
64. HENN § 237.
65. Crescent City Brewing Co. v. Flanner, 44 La. Ann. 22, 26, 10 So. 384,
385 (1891) ("scrutinized by the courts with strictness") ; House of Campbell,
Inc. v. Campbell, 172 So.2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) ; General Motors Accept.
Corp. v. Hahn, 190 So. 869 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Bland v. Paradise Coloni-
zation Co., 146 So. 778, 779 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933) ("transactions between them
should bear the closest scrutiny"). Courts also examine these transactions for harm
to third persons. See Frellsen v. Strader Cypress Co., 110 So. 877, 34 So. 857
(1903).
66. Ellett v. Morefield, 159 La. 295, 105 So. 348 (1925) (officer bought cor-
poration property at foreclosure sale) ; Parks v. Hughes, 145 La. 221, 82 So. 202
(1919) (officer sold property to corporation) ; Crescent City Brewing Co. v.
Flanner, 44 La. Ann. 22, 10 So. 384 (1891) (corporation sold property to direc-
tor); Powell v. Cavanagh, 6 La. App. 445 (Orl. Cir. 1927)) (officer bought
corporation property from seizing creditor).
67. Allardyce v. Abraham, 178 So. 170 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938), rehearing
denied, 179 So. 317 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938), affirmed. 190 La. 686, 182 So. 717
(1938) ; Geisenberger & Friedler v. Robert York & Co., 262 F. 739 (5th Cir.
1919).
68. Hancock v. Holbrook, 40 La. Ann. 53, 3 So. 351 (1888) ; 1IENI § 239.
69. House of Campbell, Inc. v. Campbell, 172 So.2d 727 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965).
70. De Soto Corp. v. Roberts Lumber & Grain Co., 174 La. 620, 141 So. 78
(1932); House of Campbell, Inc. v. Campbell, 172 So.2d 727 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965).
71. FrzTc- § 961.
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holders may be exploited to benefit the corporation in control.
Transactions between the corporations under these circum-
stances are basically the same as transactions between a corpora-
tion and its officers or directors individually, and the same rules
apply.72 Such dealings are allowed but courts examine them
closely and the burden of showing fairness is upon those who
would uphold the transaction. 7
There is a split of authority in other jurisdictions as to
whether corporate transactions authorized by officers or direc-
tors subject to a conflict of interests are voidable on that basis
alone or whether additional factors of unfairness or bad faith
are also needed.7 4 Courts have also split as to whether directors
with conflicting interests can count toward a quorum or can vote
at board meetings.75 In Louisiana these questions are answered
by Section 8476 of the Business Corporation Law. It provides
first that no transaction between a corporation and its directors
or officers, or between a corporation and a business in which its
directors or officers have an interest, shall be void or voidable
solely for that reason, nor shall a transaction be void or voidable
solely because the interested officers or directors voted for or
authorized the transaction. 77 To keep the transaction from being
void or voidable, however, Section 84 requires that:
(1) The board of directors be informed of the conflict of in-
terests and they authorize the transaction "by a vote suf-
ficient for such purpose without counting the vote of the
interested director or directors" ;78 or
(2) The shareholders entitled to vote be informed of the con-
flict of interests and they approve the transaction by a
good faith vote ;79 or
72. Mullins v. De Soto Sec. Co., 56 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. La. 1944), affirmed,
149 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1945).
73. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chalmette Oil Dist. Co., 143 F.2d 826
(5th Cir. 1944) ; Mullins v. Desoto Sec. Co., 56 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. La. 1944),
affirmed, 149 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Leathers v. Janney, 41 La. Ann. 1120,
6 So. 884 (1889) ; Fleming v. Sierra, 14 Or]. App. 168 (La. App. 1917).
74. HENN § 239.
75. FLETCHER §§ 932-938.
76. LA. R.S. 12:84 (Supp. 1968).
77. Cf. cases cited in note 73 supra.
78. LA. R.S. 12:84A(1) (Supp. 1968) ; of. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chal-
mette Oil Dist. Co., 143 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1944); Geisenberger & Friedler v.
Robert York & Co., 262 F. 739 (5th Cir. 1919) ; De Soto Corp. v. Roberts Lumber
& Grain Co., 174 La. 620, 141 So. 78 (1932) ; Giuffria Realty Co. v. Kathman-
Landry, Inc., 173 So.2d 329 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
79. Cf. Giuffria Realty Co. v. Katbman-Landry, Inc., 173 So.2d 329 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1965) ; Alexander v. Lindsay, 152 So.2d 261 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 244 La. 897, 154 So.2d 767 (1963).
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(3) The transaction be fair to the corporation at the time it
it was entered. 80
Since only one of these requirements need be met, if a transac-
tion is fair to the corporation it is not void or voidable merely
because of a conflict of interests. Finally, Section 84 makes it
clear that "[c] ommon or interested directors may be counted in
determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board
of directors ... "81
Related to the problems of competition with the corporation
and transactions with it are the situations where a director or
officer of a corporation personally usurps an opportunity pre-
sented to the corporation. 2 Again it is necessary to balance the
right of officers and directors to engage in business on their own
behalf against the fiduciary duties they owe to the corporation.
If the opportunity is in fact a corporate opportunity it is a
breach of duty for an officer or director to personally take ad-
vantage of it.s3
Just because an opportunity happens to be of the same nature
as the business of the corporation, however, it is not necessarily
a corporation opportunity. 4 The determination whether or not
it is must depend on all the circumstances. Factors to be con-
sidered include to whom the opportunity was presented,0 who
developed and financed it,86 and the relation between the oppor-
tunity and the corporation business. 7 It is not enough that the
opportunity be a desirable one; the circumstances must be such
that the corporation has an expectancy in it.88 It has been sug-
gested that the test is whether an officer or director is under
a specific duty to represent the corporation as to the particular
matter involved.8 9 However the test may be stated, it remains
a determination that must be made on the facts of each par-
ticular case.
Even if an opportunity does appear to be a corporate oppor-
80. Cf. cases cited notes 65, 73 supra.
81. Cf. Geisenberger & Friedler v. Robert York & Co., 262 F. 739 (5th Cir.
1919).
82. HENN §§ 237, 238.
83. Lawrence v. Sutton-Zwolle Oil Co., 193 La. 117, 190 So. 351 (1939).
84. Id.; FLETCHER § 862.
85. Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956).
86. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
87. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
294 U.S. 708 (1935) ; Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (Del.
1956).
88. Lawrence v. Sutton-Zwolle Oil Co., 193 La. 117, 190 So. 351 (1939).
89. Id. at 134, 190 So. at 357. See FLETCHER § 861.1 at 232.
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tunity, an officer or director may be allowed to take advantage
of it if the corporation cannot or will not do so. 90 Thus if an
opportunity presented to the corporation is ultra vires,9 ' or if
the board of directors of the corporation acts by a disinterested
vote to reject it,92 most courts allow officers or directors to act
upon it.9 Generally, however, the fact that the corporation is
unable to take advantage of an opportunity solely because it
cannot finance it at that time will not free officers or directors
to act.9 4 Most jurisdictions apply this rule strictly as to solvent
corporations, the fear being that if such a strict rule is not ap-
plied, officers and directors will not use their best efforts to
obtain financing on the corporation's behalf.9 5 If the corporation
is insolvent, courts generally recognize this as true lack of
financial ability to undertake the opportunity and officers or
directors are allowed to accept it. 9 6 The application of these rules
will vary, of course, with the circumstances. The basic criterion
is again overall fairness in light of the fiduciary relationship.9
7
Shareholders' Injury
Another recuiring situation requires a determination of the
duty owed by officers and directors to the corporation's share-
holders.98 It usually involves officers or directors buying shares
in the corporation from shareholders at reduced prices without
revealing inside information concerning the true value of the
stock. 19 Section 91 of the Business Corporation Law clarifies
the duty in these situations by extending the fiduciary relation-
ship of officers and directors to the shareholders. Prior to the
enactment of Section 91, however, unless such a transaction
amounted to fraud,100 Louisiana courts disagreed over the stand-
90. HENN § 238.
91. Alger v. Brighter Days Mining Corp., 63 Ariz. 135, 160 P.2d 346 (1945).
92. American Inv. Co. v. Lichtenstein, 134 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mo. 1955).
93. FLETCHER § 862.1. Some cases, however, indicate the officer or director
must share the opportunity with all shareholders. Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110
W. Va. 364, 58 S.E. 678 (1931) ; cf. Louisiana Mortgage Corp. v. Pickens, 167
So. 914, 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (dictum).
94. W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1962)
Electronic Development Co. v. Robson, 148 Neb. 526, 28 N.W.2d 130 (1947);
FLETCHER § 862.1; HENN § 238.
95. FLETCHER § 862.1; HENN § 238.
96. Electronic Development Co. v. Robson, 148 Neb. 526, 28 N.W.2d 130
(1947).
97. Lawrence v. Sutton-Zwolle Oil Co., 193 La. 117, 190 So. 351 (1939).
98. FLETCHER § 1167; HENN § 240.
99. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.
1959), rehearing denied, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885
(1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 926 (1959) ; Conant, Duties of Disclosure of
Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960).
100. Cf. LA. R.S. 12:95 (Supp. 1968) ; Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959), rehearing denied, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 926 (1959).
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ard by which officers and directors were bound.1 01 Throughout the
United States the so-called "majority rule" was that officers
and directors dealt with shareholders at arms-length and owed
no special duty to reveal to them inside information concerning
the true worth of their stock. 0 2 The label "majority rule" ap-
plied to this maxim was, in actual operation, somewhat of a mis-
nomer. 0 3 The United States Supreme Court created a broad ex-
ception to it in Strong v. Repide-4 when it announced the "special
facts doctrine." This doctrine recognized that officers and direc-
tors have a duty to disclose inside information to shareholders
when special circumstances place an obligation on them to do
so.105 The special circumstances in Strong were that the corpor-
ation was about to complete a large sale of property on very
favorable terms. Other courts later found special circumstances
precluding application of the "majority rule" if dividends were
pending,06 if the market value of the shares was difficult to
ascertain, 10 7 if the shareholders had little business knowledge,os
or if the officer or director had instigated the negotiations to
buy the stock. 0 9 As more and more cases came within the "special
facts doctrine" some courts discarded the "majority rule" en-
tirely and recognized that officers and directors were under a
fiduciary duty when dealing with shareholders.110 This became
known as the "minority rule" and is the view adopted in Section
91. Actually today there is little difference in result whether
the "minority rule" or the "special facts doctrine" is applied.
Both prevent profiting from inside information at the expense
of shareholders.
Even under the rule of Section 91 a corporate officer or
director is not required to reveal his opinions, as distinguished
from matters of fact, nor is he liable if there is no reliance on
101. Cf. Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937) ; In re
Liquidation of Shreveport Nat'l Bank, 118 La. 664, 43 So. 270 (1907) ; Markey
v. Hibernia Homestead Ass'n, 186 So. 757 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939).
102. In re Liquidation of Shreveport Nat'l Bank, 118 La. 664, 43 So. 270
(1907) ; FLETCHER § 1168.1; HENN § 240.
103. HENN § 240.
104. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
105. Markey v. Hibernia Homestead Ass'n, 186 So. 757 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1939).
106. Gammon v. Dain, 238 Mich. 30, 212 N.W. 957 (1927),
107. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945).
108. Cl. In re Parker's Estate, 189 Iowa 1131, 179 N.W. 525 (1920).
109. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
110. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.
1959), rehearing denied, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885
(1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 926 (1959).
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his disclosure or non-disclosure.I'l Federal regulations play an
important part in this area of law, however, and they may im-
pose liability in situations where Section 91 and the general
rules of corporation law would not apply."
REMEDIES
A full discussion of the remedies for breach of duty by cor-
poration officers and directors is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. Briefly, however, if the duty breached is owed to the
corporation or the corporation suffers harm due to the breach,
the normal remedy is for the corporation to sue in its own be-
half.1" 3 Only i'n an extreme situation is receivership or dissolu-
tion of the corporation a proper remedy," 4 and if the harm is to
the corporation exclusively, an individual shareholder does not
have a personal right of action because of it."' If the corporation
will not sue in its own behalf a derivative or secondary action
may be brought by shareholders if they meet the procedural
requirements. 1 6
If the breach of duty caused loss to shareholders personally
they may either sue individually or join together in a class
action if circumstances merit it." Likewise the Business Cor-
poration Law specifically gives creditors a right of action against
officers and directors in certain circumstances. 11 8 In any of these
cases the liability of officers and directors for breach of duty
is founded in contract, not tort, 1 9 and the applicable prescrip-
tive period is ten years unless otherwise provided."2 0
111. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945) ; HENN
§ 240.
112. For a discussion of the federal regulations in this area see Miller, The
1968 Business Corporation Law of Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 435, 470 (1969)
FLETCHER § 900.2; HENN § 298.
113. Dawkins v. Mitchell, 149 La. 1038, 90 So. 396 (1922).
114. Carey v. Dalgarn Constr. Co., 171 La. 246, 130 So. 344 (1930) ; Semple
v. Frisco Land Co., 124 La. 663, 50 So. 619 (1909) ; Farwell v. Milliken &
Farwell, Inc., 145 So.2d 644 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
115. Patterson v. Cotsoradis, 187 So.2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
116. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 591-611; FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. For a general
discussion of derivative actions and references to the many authorities who have
written upon them, see HENN §§ 352-383; N. LATIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 8 (1959).
117. See LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 591-597; FED. R. Civ. P. 23. On distinguish-
ing class actions from derivative actions, see HENN § 354.
118. LA. R.S. 12:92 (Supp. 1968).
119. LaGrone v. Brown, 161 La. 784, 109 So. 490 (1926) ; Dawkins v. Mitch-
ell, 149 La. 1038, 90 So. 396 (1922) ; Roussel Pump & Elec. Co. v. Sanderson,
216 So.2d 650 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
120. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3554; LA. R.S. 12:92D (Supp. 1968) ; Dawkins v.




Section 95 of the Business Corporation Law specifies that
provisions of the law elaborating the duties of officers and di-
rectors do not derogate in any way from the right of the cor-
poration or other persons to bring an action because of fraud
practiced upon them. 21 Similarly, comments to the 1968 Busi-
ness Corporation Law indicate creditors and third persons re-
tain all the rights and remedies they previously had."'2
CONCLUSION
The Business Corporation Law and judicial decisions provide
corporate officers and directors a general guide for all their
actions and specific standards for some of them. This legislation
and jurisprudence make it clear that officers and directors
stand in a fiduciary relation to their corporation and its share-
holders and are bound to act toward them with the due care
of reasonable men in similar circumstances. Some types of con-
duct, such as complete neglect of corporate affairs, clearly fall
short of this standard while other types, exemplified by the
business judgment rule, are definitely permissible. Between
the two extremes, however, are the many cases that can be
determined only by considering all the facts and circumstances.
In these situations the statute and judicial decisions do not
offer definite answers but allow courts the discretion needed
to apply the due care standard. This seems the proper way to
protect a corporation and its shareholders from unreasonable
conduct by officers and directors without subjecting corporate
officials to unbearable standards and rules.
James R. Pettway
121. LA. R.S. 12:95 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. Parks v. Hughes, 145 La. 221, 82
So. 202 (1919).
122. See LA. R.S. 12:92 Comment (Supp. 1968). See also LaGrone v. Brown,
161 La. 784, 109 So. 490 (1926) (suit against subscribers for unpaid portion of
subscription) ; Dilzell Engineering & Constr. Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45 So.
138 (1907) (suit against corporate receiver).
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